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Conflicting Lineages of International Law: 





This essay presents an interpretation of the juridical thought of Cicero, Hugo Grotius 
and Adam Smith. Focussing upon questions of property, capital accumulation and 
violence, the essay traces a tension within their writings between a social ethic of human 
fellowship and compassion, and, a theory of the utility of ‘unsocial’ commercial self-
interest. This tension forms a key problem for the tradition of liberal international law. 
For Grotius and Smith one response to this tension is to attempt to reign in capitalist 
markets by asserting a range of moral duties to individuals and to the nation-state. The 
importance of stressing such an interpretation is to reject the flattening-out of the liberal 
political and juridical tradition by contemporary neoliberal thought, and to reclaim a 
number of ways of thinking about the global economy and international law in which 
moral action and political intervention are understood as playing a necessary and 
essential role. 
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Introduction 
When thinking about the broad conceptual structure of modern international law, the political 
and juridical tradition of ‘liberalism’ has played a key role in shaping the direction of 
international law across the 20th and 21st centuries. There are of course a number of disparate 
ancient, early modern and modern intellectual lineages which serve as the conceptual building 
blocks or foundations of ‘liberal international law’1 and the global liberal political and juridical 
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order.2 In tracing an intellectual history of liberal international law the work of Hugo Grotius 
has often been given pride of place3 and the writings of Cicero perhaps less attention.4 The 
economic theories of Adam Smith have predominantly been seen to be important in sketching 
a vision of a liberal cosmopolitan economic order,5 and as presenting the key theoretical tools 
used in late 20th century and early 21st century neoliberal arguments6 that push for privatisation, 
free trade and unregulated free-market, capitalist economic development.7 
 
In this article I bring together aspects of the juridical thinking of Cicero, Grotius and Smith to 
draw attention to an important, though often underemphasised, tension which runs through and 
troubles modern international law. This is a tension between, on the one hand, a social ethic of 
human fellowship and compassion, and on the other, a theory of the ‘unsocial sociability’, the 
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utility of private property, self-interest and commercial relations. In the Western juridical 
tradition this tension is primarily enunciated within Aristotle’s (384–322 BCE) defence of 
private property. In the Politics Aristotle set out a theory of the social utility of private property 
which, when combined with a basic functional and geographic division of labour, exchange 
and trade, is portrayed as the best means of providing for the necessities of life. However, 
Aristotle argued also that the desire for property and wealth-getting for its own sake was not a 
virtue and leads instead to social ills and moral corruption. In this respect an excessive and 
egoistic focus upon wealth accumulation would be contrary to an ethical conception of the 
‘good life’.8 This tension can also be seen to be present within middle and later periods of Stoic 
natural law philosophy in the Hellenistic and Roman worlds,9 and is present also within early 
Christian theology in disputes over wealth and poverty.10 
 
Paying attention to questions of property, capital accumulation and violence, I trace this tension 
through the writings of Cicero, Grotius and Smith with the aim of showing how their differing 
responses develop a number of contrasting ways of organising international juridical relations. 
Such an account helps to highlight the existence of a number of conflicting lineages present 
within the tradition of liberal international law. Hence, alongside belligerent theories of 
international law, theories of a global cosmopolitan legal order, and projections of a global 
order of unrestrained markets, commerce and free trade, resides a moral theory of Grotius 
which attempts to limit commercial and state antagonism through an ethic of human fellowship. 
In contrast to a neoliberal inheritance of Smith, sits a theory of wealth generation put in service 
to a republican and statist idea of ‘love of country’, and a historical sociology which links 
capital accumulation and state formation to the process of interstate rivalry and war. Drawing 
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out these conflicting lineages is important for demonstrating points of diversity within the 
intellectual history of the tradition of liberal international law. Such an effort is necessary also 
as a means of resisting the flattening-out of the liberal political and juridical tradition by 
contemporary neoliberal thought. 
 
Property, War and Natural Rights 
The ancient Roman politician and philosopher Cicero (106 – 43 BCE) can be seen as a figure 
who synthesised aspects of pragmatic Roman law and the more conceptual Stoic idea of natural 
law.11 Cicero’s On Duties (De Officiis) (44 BCE)12 presents an ethical theory of natural law, 
property rights, rights of state and international law which still bears an important degree of 
influence within the Western juridical tradition. For Cicero, the Stoic idea of a universal natural 
law extends to all peoples, it includes within it the ius gentium, the ‘law of nations.’13 This 
natural law based ius gentium represents something of a moral standard of justice, an 
international law built upon a fellowship of humanity. Cicero’s idea of the ius gentium contains 
a set of moral duties which are meant to guide the actions of states. One key duty which is 
stipulated by natural law (governing both individuals and states) is the obligation to preserve 
one’s self against harm (self-preservation), and the corresponding duties not to harm others or 
to arbitrarily take their property. Further, natural law also includes a duty of rectifying 
injustices and of defending those who have been unjustly harmed.14 Within this account Cicero 
describes the emergence of private property out the original, pre-political or ‘natural’ condition 
of common property: 
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Of justice, the first office is that no man should harm another unless he has been 
provoked by injustice; the next that one should treat common goods as common and 
private ones as one’s own. Now no property is private by nature, but rather by long 
occupation (as when men moved into some empty property in the past), or by victory 
(when acquired in war), or by law, by settlement, by agreement, or by lot.... 
Consequently, what becomes each man’s own comes from what had in nature been 
common, each man should hold onto whatever has fallen to him. If anyone else should 
seek any of it for himself, he will be violating the law of human fellowship.15  
 
Cicero’s account of natural law involves both a justification of the historical emergence of 
private property out of the commons (via occupation, war, and agreement), and a defence of 
private property, in the sense that natural law proscribes a duty not to take another person’s 
property. Cicero condemned those in Rome who had attempted to introduce popular agrarian 
reform, and the abolition of debt for the sake of the public welfare, and saw such moves as 
creating instability and civil war which could ruin a republic.16 For Cicero the idea of land 
redistribution and the abolition of debt ran contra to the Roman idea of citizenship and Roman 
law which for a citizen involved a “free and unworried guardianship of his possessions.”17 
Further, such acts were conceived by Cicero as contrary to natural sociability. He argued that 
to take something from another, to increase one’s advantage by disadvantaging another, and 
do so by theft or violence is to destroy the common life and fellowship of men.18 In this respect 
the importance of private property remained central, and even if it had historically emerged via 
seizure or war, once established by the civil law it was to be protected.  
 
For Cicero the desire for wealth, like the desire for positions of command or honour and glory 
are not bad in themselves but these desires should not be placed above one’s duty to the 
republic. When this occurs, such excessive, individual drives render unstable and threaten the 
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existence of the republic. Further, Cicero argued that a life devoted to commercial activity was 
not a particularly virtuous one, as opposed to a life devoted to civic duty or martial virtue. His 
account portrayed agriculture more favourably to trade and scorned the act of trading purely 
for profit.19 In a broader respect there existed a tenuous relationship between the demand of 
self-preservation and, the communal duty to others within Cicero’s thought. Cicero claimed: 
It is permitted to us – nature does not oppose it – that each man should prefer to secure 
for himself rather than for another anything connected with the necessities of life. 
However, nature does not allow us to increase our means, our resources and our wealth 
by despoiling others. 
The same thing is established not only in nature, that is in the law of nations, but also 
in the law of individual peoples, through which the political community of individual 
cities is maintained: one is not allowed to harm another for the sake of one’s own 
advantage.20 
 
For Cicero, these prohibitive and positive duties extend to the field of war and help to delineate 
a legitimate from an illegitimate war under the concept of the ‘just war’. He considered a just 
war to be generally a war of defence, and one waged with the idea of peace in mind.21 Cicero’s 
natural law idea of just war thus provides a sense of moral and legal restraint upon the use of 
violence, it appears as a normative criteria of the ius gentium used to limit or restrain acts of 
war otherwise carried out for power, territorial and commercial interests.  
 
However, in Cicero’s idea of the ius gentium, two opposing values – a universal law of nature, 
and the communal good of the Roman republic22 – are combined in a variety of contradictory 
ways. Set quite starkly in contrast to the Stoic idea of a universal fellowship of humanity 
(together with the duties not cause injury to others, and not to take their property), the power 
and glory of Cicero’s Rome had been built upon a history of aggressive military expansion and 
incorporation of subject peoples on the Italian peninsular, and upon the military and 
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commercial domination of the Mediterranean. Rome’s culture inherited the Greek celebration 
of the ideal of the martial virtue of the citizen-soldier whose glory lay in selfless combat and 
death for the republic. Further, Rome’s economy had increasingly depended upon slave labour 
and upon an incessant outward expansion for territory, for the control of trade, and for the 
capture of human bodies whose forced slave-labour sustained an economy that powered the 
Roman political-military machine.23  
 
While Cicero’s idea of a just war included the old Greek notion of an honourable struggle 
amongst rivals for glory, power and reputation, he overlaid this account with a Stoic moral 
universalism which portrayed the creation and protection of the Roman Empire as largely 
beneficent and as a series of wars fought ‘justly’ in self-defence, for the protection of allies, 
and against treacherous and threatening enemies.24 In Cicero’s use, the concepts of natural law 
and ius gentium were deployed then partly as an apology for empire and as a rhetorical tool 
used to clothe an imperial war machine in the garments of moral duty and a universal natural 
law. Cicero’s idea of just war spoke the language of humanity and human fellowship but 
exclusively represented Rome’s military and commercial interests. Such a notion was not itself 
a contradiction for Cicero’s republican thought, he had argued that while one may possess a 
general duty of fellowship to humanity, one’s immediate and over-riding duty was always to 
the immediate political community, to the city-state, and in his case, to Rome.25 Hence, in 
contrast to passages where Cicero draws upon the notion of the just war to restrain violence, 
he praises the violent acts of those who have increased Rome’s power. He argued: 
(B)y whatever means they can, whether in war or at home, to increase the republic in 
power, in land and in revenues. Such are the deeds of men who are great; such deeds 
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were achieved in our forefathers’ day. Men who pursue these kinds of duties will win, 




Grotius, Property and International Law 
The Dutch scholar Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) has been treated by many 20th century legal and 
political theorists as a sort of ‘founding father’ of the modern liberal international order and 
theorist of the modern ‘Westphalian’ idea of state sovereignty.27 Grotius’ writings inherit a rich 
and varied natural law tradition stretching across ancient Aristotelian and Stoic philosophy, 
medieval canonist writings, Thomist philosophy, and the early modern Spanish scholastics. His 
work also incorporates much from European traditions of ancient and early modern humanist 
thought and Roman law.28 Importantly, Grotius inherited and expanded upon a theory of 
subjective natural rights which had developed in Europe as early as the 12th century,29 and at 
least by the 14th and 15th centuries.30 In this respect Grotius’ writings straddled a number of 
often conflicting intellectual traditions. The question of the extent to which Grotius’s work 
represents either, a continuation of an Aristotelian-Thomist ethical framework or, initiates a 
break with this tradition via presenting a ‘modern’ account of rights and sovereignty, remains 
a contested issue for scholars writing the intellectual history of Western moral and political 
thought.31 What is of interest here is the way in which aspects of this tension animate a set of 
problems related to Grotius’ theory of property relations and his account of international law. 
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On this account one element that will be emphasised is the way in which Grotius’ theory of 
natural law displays a tension between a Stoic ethic of human fellowship, and a theory of social 
utility built upon the unsocial sociability of commercial self-interest. In part, this tension relates 
to a conflict between self-interest and human fellowship present within the natural law theory 
of Cicero. The argument however is not that Grotius’ theory of natural law is necessarily a 
replication of that given by Cicero. Rather, that a particular conceptual tension found within 
ancient natural law jurisprudence develops, in somewhat different ways, in the work of Grotius 
and then Smith. The contrasting dynamics of this tension are worth exploring and have 
relevance to how we understand today the intellectual history and conceptual structure of a 
broadly ‘liberal’ idea of international law. 
 
Grotius’ early work on international law, particularly, The Free Sea (1609)32 was written in the 
context of acting as an advocate for the Dutch East India Company, and of developing a theory 
of a universal natural law and ius gentium which could combat Portuguese and Spanish claims 
to colonial and trade monopolies over the new world.33 His later major work, On the Law of 
War and Peace (De jure belli ac pacis) (1625),34 developed a natural law based theory of 
international law which expressed a theory of individual, private property and contractual rights 
widespread in late 16th and early 17th century Northern European commerce and global trade.35 
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10 
 
This is not to say that Grotius reduced all international law to a theory of private property. His 
cosmopolitan and ‘multicultural’ theory of international law acknowledged also the validity of 
a variety of alternative property relations.36 However the question of private property remains 
central to Grotius’s idea of international law and a number of problems and issues flow from 
his account. Further, alongside the question of private property other tensions run through 
Grotius’s work. In one sense his theory of international law expressed a spirit of free 
conscience, a rights-based natural law of a free, Protestant commercial people who had fought 
and won a war of liberation against Spanish feudal domination and imperialism.37 Yet his 
account also echoed aspects of an apology for state authoritarianism and expressed a theory of 
state sovereignty in which the sovereign’s ability to hold together a peaceful, internal juridical 
order was considered vital.38 
 
Building upon the concepts of ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ right found within the natural law 
and natural rights traditions Grotius outlined a theory of modern sovereignty which focussed 
upon securing natural rights in the context of a wider theory of justice. Following Cicero, for 
Grotius, the natural right to life is considered primary and with it comes the injunction to 
preserve one’s life (self-preservation)39 and the duty not to do harm to others.40 Contained 
within the duty of self-preservation is the right of self-defence against harm.41 This position 
was situated within a wider theory of natural human sociability. For Grotius, humans are not 
naturally selfish creatures. Following the Aristotelian conception of innate and political 
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39 Grotius, H. The Rights of War and Peace, p. 180; 187. 




sociality, and the Stoic concept of oikeiosis, Grotius argued that because humans are naturally 
social creatures who engage in moments of interaction and care, and who can judge their desires 
and the desires of others through the use of reason, the demand for self-preservation leads 
humans towards a key social good – peaceful sociability.42 For Grotius sovereign authority is 
justified not by any external religious authority, but is derived by natural reason and relations 
of consent in which humans group together out of mutual need and protection.43 Sovereign 
authority gains its justification through the state’s ability to protect natural rights, and stop civil 
conflict and war. For Grotius, self-preservation and peaceful sociability is best maintained if 
individuals submit to a third party – the state – to protect their natural rights.44 
 
One central function of this natural rights idea of state sovereignty is the protection of private 
property rights. For Grotius, in an original pre-historical, natural condition of humanity, all 
property was held in ‘common’. However, through occupation and use, as well as through theft, 
seizure and through contracts and agreements where communal property is divided via mutual 
consent, forms of private property began to be carved out of the commons and both human 
laws of custom and the legislation of states turned these into enforceable legal rights.45 For 
Grotius: 
From hence we learn, upon what account men departed from the ancient community, 
first of moveable and then of immovable things: namely, because men being no longer 
contented with what the earth produced itself for their nourishment; being no longer 
willing to dwell in caves, covered only with the barks of trees, or the skins of wild 
beasts, wanted to live in a more commodious and more agreeable manner; to which end 
labour and industry was necessary, which some employed for one thing, and others for 
another. And there was no possibility then of using things in common; first by reason 
of the distance of places where each was settled; and afterwards because of the defect 
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of equity and love, whereby a just equality would not have been observed either in their 
labour or in the or in the consumption of their fruits and revenues. 
 
Thus also we see what was the original of property, which was derived not from a mere 
internal act of the mind, since one could not possibly guess what others designed to 
appropriate to themselves, that he might abstain from it; and besides, several might have 
had mind to the same thing, at the same time; but it resulted from a certain compact or 
agreement; either expressly as by a division; or else tacitly, as by seizure. For as soon 
as living in common was no longer approved of, all men were supposed, and ought to 
be supposed to have consented, that each should appropriate to himself, by right of first 
possession, what could not have been divided.46 
 
Within this passage Grotius repeats a historical justification of private property developed 
much earlier by Cicero. Yet, there is another sense in which Grotius adds to the natural rights 
tradition by casting private property as a ‘natural right’.47 He did so via expanding upon a set 
of earlier Aristotelian arguments, by emphasising the trans-historic role of ‘natural necessity’ 
and intensifying the role of social utility as it operated through the ‘division of labour’.48 In this 
account the emphasis upon the drive for self-preservation, for comfort, for the betterment of 
the human condition through the use of tools, land, exchange and trade operates as if it were a 
form of ‘natural reason’. In this sense Grotius argued that private property was a ‘natural right’, 
even if this was not the case in the original natural condition and was a product of history.49 
This natural right to property had to be protected and it was one of the roles of the state to do 
so. 
  
Grotius’ justification of the role of private property reflected a practical understanding of the 
progressive power of modern commerce which had propelled the small Dutch state in the late 
16th and early 17th centuries into a major global commercial and military power.50 His account 
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48 Aristotle, “Politics”, 2.5, p. 1151 (1263a); 1.9, pp. 1138-140, (1257a). 
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articulated a theoretical link between private property, the utility of economic exchange, and 
the idea of social progress,51 developed a ‘stadial theory’ of history and involved an optimistic 
theory of historical progress.52 Within this however there is a degree of conflict between aspects 
of Grotius’ thought which his approach to property and exchange attempts to overcome. The 
element of self-interestedness contained within the historical development of private property 
conflicts somewhat with Grotius’ Stoic idea of a natural sociability based on mutual need, care, 
compassion and affection.53  
 
Grotius attempted to reconcile this conflict by portraying commerce and global free trade as 
the means by which mutual need is met and by which natural sociability is historically 
enhanced and developed. Hence, it is the drive towards self-preservation, the desire for comfort 
and betterment which pushes the development of private property relations and commercial 
exchange. Out of this the ever-growing relations of commerce and global trade operate as a 
form of mutual assistance which enable the satisfaction of the needs of the individual through 
the acts of others. In this respect, in Grotius’s natural rights theory a degree of self-interest (as 
Stoic-Ciceronian self-preservation54), combined with mutual need, expresses itself via 
                                                          
51 Grotius, H. The Rights of War and Peace, pp. 443-444. On the positive role of trade via the ‘free sea’ Grotius 
quotes firstly Plutarch: 
 
Human Life would have been wild and savage, there would have been no Intercourse between Men, 
were it not for this Element, which furnishes them with the Means of supplying one another’s Wants; 
and of forming Acquaintances and Friendships by the Exchanges they make.  
 
And then Libanius: 
 
God has not bestowed all his Gifts upon every Part of the Earth, but has distributed them among 
different Nations, that Men wanting the Assistance of one another, might maintain and cultivate 
Society. And to this End has Providence introduced Commerce, that whatsoever is the Produce of any 
Nation may be equally enjoyed by all.  
 
52 Garnsey, P. Thinking About Property, p. 139. 
53 Grotius, H. The Rights of War and Peace, pp. 79-87.  
54 Ibid, p. 185. Grotius argues: 
 
It is not against the Nature of Human Society, for everyone to provide for, and take Care of himself… 
 
This follows a quote from Cicero: 
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commerce, which operates as the primary media (alongside the state, religion, and the family) 
that promotes and deepens human sociability. Such an idea of a natural law of global commerce 
becomes central for liberal political tradition and is a key conceptual foundation of the liberal 
tradition of international law. 
 
Grotius’ theory of natural rights does not however express an outright celebration of 
commercial selfishness as can be found later in the work of Thomas Hobbes55 and Bernard 
Mandeville.56 While for Grotius, commercial self-interest produces a degree of social utility, 
his account of property relations still broadly shares an Aristotelian sense of social virtue which 
discouraged the idea of pursuing trade solely for the sake of profit.57 As such the selfish desires 
for wealth and luxury were not seen by Grotius as virtuous, but were portrayed as a common 
cause of war and social discord.58 Further, Grotius emphasised also the Christian moral virtues 
of charity, humility, and benevolence and echoed also aspects of Thomas Aquinas’ framing of 
private property relations.59 Following Aquinas, Grotius argued that in cases of extreme need 
and emergency, such as famine, rights to private property could be temporarily suspended. In 
such circumstances the taking of another’s property for the sake of self-preservation would not 
amount to theft.60 Alongside this Grotius counselled a moral role of compassion when dealing 
with impoverished creditors,61 and argued for the fair and non-exploitative treatment of 
customers by merchants holding monopolies.62  
                                                          
 
Nature allows every Man to provide the Necessaries of Life, rather for himself than for another… 
 
55 Hobbes, T. Leviathan, (1651), Tuck, R. (ed.), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
56 Mandeville, B. The Fable of the Bees: Or, Private Vices, Publick Benefits, (1714) (London: Penguin, 1989). 
57 Aristotle, “Politics” 1.9, pp. 1138-140, (1257a). 
58 Grotius, H. The Rights of War and Peace, pp. 197; 219-22.  
59 Ibid, pp. 178; 1478. See also: Aquinas “Summa Theologiae” in Aquinas, Political Writings, Dyson, R.W. (ed.) 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 66.2, pp. 207-8. 
60 Grotius, H. The Rights of War and Peace pp. 434-5; Aquinas “Summa Theologiae” 66.7, p. 216-7. 
61 Grotius, H. The Rights of War and Peace p. 1478 
62 Ibid, p. 452. Consider also Grotius’ emphasis upon a republican duty to give up one’s life in defence of the 




This account links also with Grotius’ emphasis upon a natural law and republican idea of 
maintaining forms of non-privatised, common property, such as oceans and seas, which are 
needed to maintain the public good of all peoples.63 In this manner the Stoic sense of 
compassion, the Aristotelian republican ethic concerned with a socially-orientated good life, 
and the Christian idea of charity all played an important role in the way Grotius attempted to 
morally frame private property relations. On this account private property rights are not 
absolute and instead reside within an ethically-bounded political and social context in which, 
at times, certain forms of common ownership and political duty have precedence. 
 
One way then of interpreting the tension in Grotius between an ethic of human fellowship and 
an unsocial commercial sociability, would be to read Grotius as accepting the existence of 
selfish and jealous passions within human social relations, and asserting against this a universal 
framework of natural law to guide humans towards more appropriate forms of moral behaviour. 
For Grotius, such a universal moral framework aimed at the respecting of rights and redress 
and punishment of wrongs is the basis of international law and the law of war. On this account 
one chief role of international law is to help render the ‘natural’ relation of private property 
rights and global commerce as peaceful as possible. 
 
Grotius’ account envisages a global set of individual human rights to life and private property 
sitting alongside the rights of states which are treated as if they are human individuals with 
rights and duties. Individual and corporate rights to life (self-preservation, sovereignty) and to 
property, as well as jointly held rights over the commons (oceans), are to be guaranteed by 
                                                          
63 Ibid, pp. 420-53; Grotius, H. The Free Sea, pp. 24-5; 49-50. 
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international law, and when infringed are to be defended by force via ‘just war’.64 This vision 
of international law justifies free trade in principle, but also allows states to close-off spheres 
of mutual economic interest when built upon commercial contracts and mutual consent.65 In a 
very broad sense Grotius’ takes the Stoic-Ciceronian concepts of self-preservation, the duty 
not to harm others, the respect of contracts, treaties, private property and common property, 
and uses these to reimagine and project a global juridical space consistent with 17th century 
commercial and trade relations. 
 
Grotius’ conception of the law of war inherits natural law accounts that went before him, such 
as that developed by Francisco de Vitoria,66 in which the ‘just war’ is traditionally understood 
as a war of self-defence and self-preservation.67 Such an account rejects Cicero’s argument that 
war could be waged for the ‘glory’ of a republic and empire, and describes as ‘unjust’ wars 
aimed at territorial conquest, religious conversion or launched to pre-empt the rising threat of 
an adversary.68 Further, Grotius described as unjust the act of war which claimed a rightful 
ownership of territory because the inhabitants were wicked, lacked intelligence or had false 
religious beliefs.69 For Grotius, war may only generally be waged to avenge an injury70 and 
should be done in a proportionate way,71 and with a degree of prudence rather than 
recklessness.72 Built into this account also is notion which resembles the contemporary idea of 
                                                          
64 Ibid, p. 189; 198; 393-7. 
65 Ibid, pp. 452-3; 465; 4714. On the question of the role of ‘monopoly’ in Grotius and his relation to the work 
of John Selden, see generally: Anand, R.P. Origin and Development of the Law of the Sea, (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), pp. 82-107; Armitage, D. The Ideological Origins of the British Empire, pp. 103-122. 
Somos, M. “Selden's Mare Clausum: The Secularisation of International Law and the Rise of Soft Imperialism.” 
Journal of the History of International Law, 14 (2) 2012 pp. 287-330. 
66 Vitoria, F. Political Writings, Padgen, A. & Lawrance, J. (eds.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991). See generally: Schmitt, C. The Nomos of the Earth, (tr.) Ulmen, G.L. (New York: Telos Press 2003); 
Grewe, W.G. The Epochs of International Law, (tr.) Byers, M. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyer, 2000). 
67 Grotius, H. The Rights of War and Peace, p. 180; 397-8; 416-7 
68 Ibid, pp. 1097-1114. 
69 Ibid, p. 1104. 
70 Ibid, p. 396-401. Including the duty to protect friends and allies, pp. 1155-8. 
71 Ibid, p. 417. 
72 Ibid, p. 1116, 113-4. 
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the ‘responsibility to protect’ whereby contained within the idea of ‘punishment’,73 the ‘just 
war’ could be considered as a defence of the natural rights of others. This was the idea that 
states could intervene to protect vulnerable others suffering from the abuse of their natural 
rights.74 Such a notion sits somewhat uncomfortably within Grotius’ theory of just war and 
reflects perhaps an earlier, more expansionist account of war developed in The Free Sea, where 
Grotius had argued that war could be fought “for the freedom and liberty of all mankind.”75 
 
One final point of note which speaks to a tension within Grotius’ theory of natural law is the 
historical question of the possible violent origins of private property. In On the Law of War 
and Peace Grotius placed a heavy emphasis upon the role of consent in the act of privatising 
property rights out of common property. On this account the creation of private property rights 
were seen to take place as a consensual, social act. Occupation and possession generate private 
property rights only through the inter-subjective acts of others who consent to and affirm these 
rights. Grotius argued that the generation of a private property right cannot merely be an 
“internal act of mind”, but that it comes about through “compacts and agreements” and the 
“division” of property through “consent.”76  
 
However, there is sense within Grotius’ account which alludes to a less consensual basis for 
the creation of private property rights, that is, to a form of ‘consent’ which is not given on 
precisely equal and free terms. Grotius alludes to this when he speaks of the creation of private 
property rights via ‘tacit consent’ and ‘seizure.’77 In describing an initial division and 
                                                          
73 Grotius, H. The Rights of War and Peace, pp. 1018-1021. 
74 Ibid, pp. 1021-4. See also: Tuck, R. The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International 
Order From Grotius to Kant, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 103. 
75 Grotius, H. The Free Sea, p. 58. 
76 Grotius, H. The Rights of War and Peace, pp. 426-7. 





recognition of private property Grotius claimed that “(E)veryone appropriated to himself those 
he could seize on.”78 Further, that: 
It resulted from a certain Compact and Agreement, either expressly, as by Division; or 
else tacitly, as by Seizure.79 
 
Such a notion is slightly ambiguous, and sits in contrast to other facets of his work. One way 
of explaining this aspect of Grotius’ account is to see his description of the origin of private 
property as displaying a conflict between his dual inheritance of the scholastic natural law 
tradition and the humanist intellectual tradition, with the latter’s emphasis upon understanding 
history and social power relations. In this respect, on the one hand, Grotius asserts a normative 
natural law concern with the ‘proper’ consensual creation and regulation of private property 
relations which condemns violent conquest and theft. On the other hand, his account bears 
witness to the historical emergence of both property and sovereign relations which sometimes, 
though not all of the time, have taken place via acts of murder, seizure, violence and brute 
force. For Grotius both the Old Testament and ancient Roman writers of history and tragedy 
provided accounts of the violent origins of private property and political power. In this sense 
he claimed that: 
The most antient Arts were those of Agriculture, and Feeding Cattle; they were 
exercised by the first Brothers, so that there was between them some Sort of Division 
of Goods. The Diversity of Inclination, immediately produced Jealousy, and afterwards 
Murder.80 
 
In the earlier The Free Sea (1609), Grotius’ account of the historical and ‘natural’ justification 
of private property is followed by a quote from Seneca’s Thyestes: “Between us lies the crime 
for him who first shall do it.”81 This can be read as something of a ‘realist’ acknowledgement 
                                                          
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid, p. 424. 
81 Grotius, H. The Free Sea, p. 23. 
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of the crimes and murders that lie at the origins of many juridical and political institutions – 
the violence of taking and making property, of founding cities and colonies, and of creating 
ruling dynasties and sovereign relations. Viewed in this light Grotius’ condemnation of the 
colonial conquest of territory via spurious ‘just war’ claims, (such as that undertaken by the 
Spanish and Portuguese empires), can be understood as the moral insistence that any past 
crimes of ‘seizure’ be not repeated in the present. 
 
Such passing references to the violent origins of property point to a degree of historic 
unsociability sitting underneath Grotius’ moral theory of human fellowship and respect for the 
rights and property of others. An awareness of this tension was inherited by subsequent natural 
law and natural rights scholars who drew attention to the very paradoxical nature of private 
property relations. The 18th century natural law theorist Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-78) 
viewed the contradiction between a universal moral regime of natural rights, and the violent 
origins of property (leading to widespread inequality and conditions of economic domination), 
as a moral outrage. For Rousseau, in the Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality 
Among Men (1755), the violent creation of private property rights through seizure represents a 
historic ‘wrong’ turned into a ‘right’, something which natural law should properly condemn, 
and something which throws the whole law of private property and modern social relations of 
inequality into question.82 
 
Adam Smith and the Question of Property 
One 18th century response to the possible violent origins of private property rights is given by 
Adam Smith (1723-90). Smith’s account responds to a discourse of levelling politics, critical 
                                                          
82 Rousseau, J. “Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men” (1755) in The Basic 




of the idea of private property and wealth inequality, such as exemplified by the account 
developed in Rousseau’s Discourse on Inequality. Smith’s account adopted and developed 
many of Rousseau’s critiques of modern commercial society. Yet, contra Rousseau, Smith’s 
account also presented a powerful defence of private property, inequality and the socially 
beneficial and progressive role of modern commerce.83 In this respect Smith’s account attempts 
to reconcile a number of tensions related to property, inequality, and commercial 
(un)sociability present in Grotius’ theory of natural law and in Rousseau’s critical reframing 
of the natural law tradition. 
 
Smith’s approach is key in that it outlines a form of economic, political and juridical thinking 
which becomes fundamental to subsequent attempts by many scholars and political actors in 
the late 19th and 20th centuries to project and bring into being a global, liberal order. Oddly, for 
contemporary theorists of international law, Smith is often portrayed as a minor figure, whose 
contribution is dwarfed by the cosmopolitanism and moral theory developed by Immanuel Kant 
(1724-1804).84 Kant’s theory of cosmopolitan rights, moral critique of aggressive just war, 
juridical framework of ‘perpetual peace’, and commercial idea of ‘unsocial sociability’ 
(ungesellige Geselligkeit) inherit much of a conceptual structure developed by Grotius and has 
been drawn upon heavily by modern liberals in attempting to craft a distinctively ‘liberal’ idea 
of international law.85  
 
                                                          
83 On the relationship between Rousseau and Smith see: Rasmussen, D. “Adam Smith and Rousseau: 
Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment” Berry, C. et. al., (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Adam Smith 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
84 Kant, I. “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch’” (1795) in Political Writings, (ed.) Reiss, H.I. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Kant, I. “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan 
Purpose” (1784) in Kant, I. Political Writings, Reiss, H.I. (ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
85 See generally: Bull, H. Anarchical Society, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1977); Carr, E.H. The 
Twenty Year’s Crisis: 1919-1939, (Basingstoke: Palgrave McMillan, 2001); Bohman, J. and Lutz-Bachman, M. 
(eds.) Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant’s Cosmopolitan Ideal, (Cambridge Mass,; MIT Press, 1997); Rawls, J. 
The Law of Peoples, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993). 
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One reason however for focussing upon and emphasising the work of Smith, rather than Kant, 
is that Kant’s analysis rarely pursues the problems of ‘unsocial sociability’ as they relate to 
questions of property, capital accumulation and social and interstate conflict.86 In contrast, 
Smith’s attempt to reconcile an ethic of human sociability with unsocial commercial relations 
relies upon developing a historical sociology of violence, dispossession and war, and then 
tempering this with an economic theory designed, not as a naïve idea of commercial progress, 
but as a prudential art of governance. There is a degree of pragmatism contained in Smith’s 
approach, the original violence laying at the foundation of property relations is acknowledged 
historically. However this original violence is deemed unimportant and fades in comparison 
when viewed in contrast to the productive and wealth generating power of modern commercial 
societies which are understood as providing better lives for all individuals. 
 
Smith’s economic and jurisprudential arguments have proved to be highly influential in 
shaping the liberal tradition and are often assumed, though rarely cited, by modern international 
lawyers. What follows involves a focus upon the tensions contained within Smith’s account, 
and examines how Smith inherits and develops much from Grotius’ theory of natural rights, as 
well as how Smith breaks away from a number of Grotius’ key positions. Such an approach is 
important for not merely understanding Smith as a scholar of international law, but for forming 
a clearer understanding of the conflicts and limitations contained within the idea of liberal 
international law more generally. 
 
                                                          
86 For critiques of Kant’s position see: Kochi, T. The Other’s War: Recognition and the Violence of Ethics, 
(Abingdon: Birkbeck Law Press, 2009); Veitch, S. Law and Irresponsibility: On the Legitimation of Human 
Suffering, (Abingdon: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007). 
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Smith’s thought has sometimes been criticised for offering a somewhat naïve or confused 
account of the origin of wealth and capital accumulation.87 Attention is generally paid to 
Smith’s comments in the An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 
(1776)88 where Smith refers to ‘previous’ accumulation. In this the accumulation of stock takes 
place primarily through thrift and saving.89 However, looking at Smith’s Lectures on 
Jurisprudence (1762-3; 1763-4),90 which are a copy of Smith’s University of Glasgow lecture 
notes, (a version of which was first posthumously published in 1896), it is clear that Smith held 
a very realistic view of the historical violence that underpinned private property and capital 
accumulation. 
 
The traditions of natural law and natural rights play an important role in Smith’s thought and 
his account of the emergence of private property rights forms part of this intellectual tradition.91 
Smith’s account of property, drawing on Roman law and Grotius, places an emphasis on the 
role of occupation and is critical of the mythical nature of John Locke’s labour theory of 
property ownership.92 Smith develops a ‘stadial history’ of social-property relations which 
outlined a shift from relatively egalitarian modes of communal property relations towards 
                                                          
87 Marx, K. Capital, Vol. 1, (tr.) Fowkes, B. (London: Penguin, 1990), pp. 873-4. See also: Perelman, M. The 
Invention of Capitalism: Classical Political Economy and the Secret History of Primitive Accumulation, 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), pp. 25-7. 
88 Smith, A. The Wealth of Nations, Vol. 1, Skinner, A. (ed.) (London: Penguin, 1999); Smith, A. The Wealth of 
Nations, Vol. 2, Skinner, A. (ed.) (London: Penguin, 1999). 
89 Smith, A. Wealth of Nations, Vol. 1, pp. 371-2; 437; 446. 
90 Smith, A.  Lectures On Jurisprudence, Meek, R., Raphael, D., & Stein, P. (eds.), (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 
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Press, 2010); Koskenniemi, M. “International Law and the Emergence of Mercantile Capitalism: Grotius to 
Smith”, in Dupuy, P. & Chetail, V. (eds), The Roots of International Law, (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 2013).  
92 Smith, A.  Lectures On Jurisprudence, LJ (B) p. 459; LJ(A), p. 13; Locke, J. Two Treatises of Government, 
(1689) Laslett, P. (ed.), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 287-90. 
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modes of private property ownership marked by higher levels of inequality. Smith’s stadial 
history, which is characterised generally by upward social progress and ‘development’ and 
traces a movement from conditions of scarcity to opulence, contains four stages: hunter-
gathering; shepherding; agriculture; and commerce. Within this account the methods by which 
property is acquired, and the content of a property right, is dependent upon the historical, 
material, socio-economic conditions of each period of historical development.93 Given 
property’s historical contingency, Smith could claim that “The only case where the origin of 
natural rights is not altogether plain, is in that of property.”94   
 
In a manner which echoes and intensifies Grotius’ earlier historical account of the development 
of property relations, the concepts of ‘nature’ (‘natural progress’), ‘necessity’ and ‘utility’ play, 
for Smith, an important role in historically driving modes of subsistence and accumulation, the 
division of labour and the production and exchange of surplus.95 For Smith, property ownership 
                                                          
93 Ibid, LJ(A), p. 14-6. See also: Meek, R. “Smith, Turgot and the ‘Four Stages’ Theory” History of Political 
Economy, 3(1) (1971), pp. 9-27; Alvey, J. “Adam Smith’s View of History: Consistent or Paradoxical?” History 
of the Human Sciences, 16(2) (2003), pp. 1-25; Pitts, J. A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in 
Britain and France, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). 
94 Smith, A. Lectures On Jurisprudence, LJ(A), p. 13. 
95 Ibid, pp. 14-15, Smith referring to the transition from hunting to shepherding: 
 
In the process of time, as their numbers multiplied, they would find the chase too precarious for their 
support. They would be necessitated to contrive some other method whereby to support themselves... 
The most naturally contrivance they would think of, would be to tame some of those wild animals they 
caught... 
 
At p, 15, Smith referring to the transition from shepherding to agriculture: 
 
But when society becomes too numerous they would find difficulty supporting themselves by herds and 
flocks. Then they would naturally turn themselves to the cultivation of land and the raising of such plants 
and trees as produced nourishment for them.  
 
At pp. 15-16, Smith referring to the transition from agriculture to commerce: 
 
As society was further improved, the several arts, which at first would be exercised by each individual 
as far as was necessary for his welfare, would be separated; some persons would cultivate one and others 
others, as they severally inclined. They would exchange with one another what they produced more than 
was necessary for their support, and get in exchange for them the commodities they stood in need of and 
did not produce themselves. This exchange of commodities extends in time not only betwixt the 





arises out of acts of possession situated within historical-material relations, such that in one 
sense, modes of the division of property are derived from the differing forms of subsistence, 
accumulation, production and exchange occurring at different stages of history. For example, 
hunters have only small personal possessions, wandering shepherds possess property in 
animals, and an increase in private property emerges with the development of agriculture and 
settlement in towns and cities.96 However within Smith’s thought the legal form of property 
relations is not completely derivative and plays an important role in shaping moral sentiment, 
conceptions of prudence and justice, which can be reasserted to direct and organise the social 
order.97 Social relations and the juridical form (law, right) may be thought then to co-determine 
each other in Smith’s jurisprudence. 
 
On Smith’s account the formation of government and laws are closely bound to the process of 
socio-economic development. Law develops not from some imagined consent or agreement 
but arises in relation to “the natural progress which men make in society.”98 Significantly, law 
follows from and potentially holds in place economic inequality. Under the conditions of 
inequality the establishment of law is less some imagined social contract or consent and 
resembles more a succession of historical acts of domination and the reassertion of claims of 
equality against this.99 For Smith, inequality is a consequence of a historical, socio-economic 
shift from the more precarious nature of hunter-gathering in the commons to the private 
ownership of animals within herding. This change involves the emergence of distinctions 
between the rich who own the herds and the poor who depend upon the rich for their subsistence 
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98 Smith, A. Lectures On Jurisprudence, LJ(A), p. 207. 
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and provide labour for them.100 On Smith’s account, government becomes necessary to protect 
the changed nature of property rights and to hold a society stable against the tensions caused 
by economic inequality. Smith argues: 
Laws and government may be considered in this and indeed in every case as a 
combination of the rich to oppress the poor, and preserve to themselves the inequality 
of goods which would otherwise be soon destroyed by the attacks of the poor, who if 
not hindered by the government would soon reduce the others to an equality with 
themselves by open violence. The government and laws hinder the poor from ever 
acquiring the wealth by violence which they would otherwise exert on the rich; they 
tell them they must either continue poor or acquire wealth in the same manner as they 
have done.101   
 
For Smith the different forms of inequality historically emerge within herding, under 
agriculture, within slave owning societies, and then via the operation of wage labour within 
commercial societies. All of these cases stand in sharp contrast to the relative degree of equality 
portrayed in hunter-gather societies at a point where private property was non-existent or 
minimal, and in contrast also to the degree of equality projected onto the idea of citizenship 
within ancient republics (both cases animating Rousseau’s moral objections to inequality).102 
In a sense, Smith’s historical reconstruction of property relations frames law, government and 
private property as both a ‘wrong’ and as ‘right’. Property and government emerge historically 
through force, violence and seizure, but then are reconceived in each historical moment by the 
holders of property as the legitimate form of juridical and political relations. 
 
By historically reconstructing the development of juridical and social-property relations as 
involving violence and seizure, and the domination of the poor by a ‘class’ of property owners, 
Smith’s account strikes up against a tension between the unsocial aspect of private property 
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101 Ibid, p. 208. See also: Smith, A. The Wealth of Nations, Vol. 2, p. 302. 
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relations and a natural law theory aimed at the respect of individuals encompassing a Stoic 
ethic of care. When Smith’s historical account of property in the Lectures on Jurisprudence is 
set alongside The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759)103 his approach echoes a tension that runs 
through the natural rights thinking of Grotius and Rousseau. On the one hand, private property 
is viewed as necessary in modern commercial societies for self-preservation and individual 
autonomy.104 On the other hand, an ethic of ‘sympathy’ and compassion, the concern for the 
welfare and happiness of others, and the worry over impoverishment and suffering105 sits 
uncomfortably with acts of violence which cause harm to others and robs them of their 
possessions and their livelihood.106  
  
Smith’s response to the paradox of property and problem of inequality is too intensify 
arguments found in Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf107 and Locke108 by emphasising the social utility 
of self-interest, private property and the productive power of modern commercial society which 
is understood as the best means of providing for the happiness of the whole of society. Smith’s 
approach echoes David Hume’s rejection of any return to the idealised egalitarianism of ancient 
republics,109 and sees self-interest within modern commerce as being a more efficient means 
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(eds.), (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2003), pp. 52-6; 132. 
108 Locke, J. Two Treatises of Government, pp. 296-9. 
109 Hume, D. “Of Commerce” (1752) in Political Essays, Haakonssen, K. (ed.), (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), pp. 97-102. 
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of providing for the needs of society than any levelling or redistributive, egalitarian politics 
built on love and compassion such as that propounded by Rousseau. For Smith, self-interested, 
commercial action operates as an “invisible hand” which has the unintended consequence of 
advancing the interests of society.110 
 
Istvan Hont argues that Smith’s metaphor of the ‘invisible hand’ is used to show how the self-
interested condition of private property relations operates to unlock the productive powers of 
human labour in a way that could not be matched by egalitarian arrangements which otherwise 
struggled to feed populations under conditions of high population growth.111 Hont argues: 
It was the productivity of workers and the goods available for consumption per capita, 
he argued, that were the true indicators of economic success. Such indicators were high 
in most well-managed modern economies based on private property, Smith wrote, and 
miserably low in egalitarian alternatives. Therefore the egalitarian and levelling politics 
of envy deserved no serious attention from those who constructed a new science of the 
legislator. What really mattered was not inequality but the decent living standard of all, 
including the poorest stratum of society.  
 
This argument constituted the “paradox of commercial society.” The economic efficacy 
of inequality was a paradox because it drove a wedge between the traditional egalitarian 
intuitions of Western moral thought and the guiding assumptions of modern political 
economy. The success of commercial society was counterintuitive to those who 
expected that political and economic equality must somehow proceed hand in hand. 
The new idiom suggested, instead, that legal and political equality could coexist with 
economic inequality without causing endemic instability in modern Western states. 
“Liberalism,” as this new political form came to be called in the next century, could 
even be defined by the coexistence of political and legal equality and significant 
economic inequality in the very same polity and society. This was the truly modern 
feature of the “modern republics” that have emerged in the modern era, for traditional 
political wisdom assumed that republics had to be egalitarian, and democracies even 
more so. Smith accepted the spectacular inequalities of modern society both morally 
and politically because they were not only compatible with, but indeed the prerequisite 
of, a society’s capacity to provide welfare even for its poorest working members. The 
poorest workers in a modern commercial state enjoyed a better standard of living than 
even the richest members of undeveloped societies or of any past society.112  
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In one sense Smith’s approach to the question of the original violence and series of wrongs that 
underlie the historical emergence of private property and social inequality is a pragmatic one. 
This relates to Smith’s belief that modern commercial societies are simply better at providing 
for the welfare and needs of the population than egalitarian modes of political and economic 
organisation. For Smith, like Bernard Mandeville, in commercial societies built around private 
property and free markets, self-interest, inequality and the desires of selfishness and 
grandeur113 create the unintended consequence of providing for the needs of others. In this 
sense Smith, in The Wealth of Nations, argued that “It is not from the benevolence of the 
butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own 
interest.”114 
 
For Smith, the most practical way of exercising the social ethic of care, compassion and 
sympathy for the needs of others is not to redistribute or redress historic wrongs, but instead to 
organise the governance of economy and society in a way that mobilises the ‘natural’ operation 
of the market and economic self-interest and unlocks the productive power of the social and 
economic division of labour.115 Linked to self-interest, Smith’s image of the functional division 
of labour contained in the ‘pin factory’116 is portrayed as the engine room of a modern, wealth-
generating society. In such a society, economic inequality is not merely accepted, it is viewed 
as an important and productive part of an economic system of self-interest. The desire for 
wealth, capital investment and market rationality generate both private wealth and social utility 
by raising the living standards of all members of society through the efficient production and 
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exchange (via the geographical division of labour between town and country) of cheap 
foodstuffs and consumer goods.117 
 
Smith’s outline of a theory of market-based, capitalist political economy turns a set of historic 
wrongs into a global and universal idea of natural law and natural right which can bring 
progress, economic growth, wealth and opulence when the ‘natural’ operation of the market118 
and the right of individual economic choice and autonomy119 are encouraged to operate across 
societies without monopolistic or protectionist interference by government.120 When viewed 
purely through the economic frame of progress, development and growth via the market, the 
‘wrongs’ of historic violent seizure and economic inequality fade to insignificance. One 
example of this is Smith’s somewhat contradictory portrayal of European colonialism and 
empire. In one sense Smith openly condemned the violent practice of European colonialism 
since the 16th century, treating as a ‘wrong’ the theft of land and the destruction of the 
civilisations and lives of indigenous peoples.121 Yet, in another sense, Smith acknowledged the 
degree of economic and social ‘progress’ that had been brought about through the history of 
colonisation.122 
 
One way of making sense of this contradiction is to interpret Smith’s account as one which 
worries little over past wrongs because he was focussed upon outlining a future-orientated, 
                                                          
117 Smith, A. Lectures On Jurisprudence, LJ(A) pp. 340-9; Smith, A. The Wealth of Nations, Vol. 1, pp. 479-84. 
118 With regard to the idea of the ‘natural’ operation of the market, alongside Grotius and Locke, Smith’s 
position also echoes ideas expressed by Hume, François Quesnay (1694–1774) and Anne Robert Jacques Turgot 
(1727–1781). See: Meek, R. The Economics of Physiocracy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1962). 
119 Smith, A. The Wealth of Nations, Vol. 2, p. 163. 
120 Ibid, pp. 33-5; 105-6; 118-9; 273-5. 
121 Ibid, pp. 25; 142. 
122 Ibid, pp. 145; 148; 153; 209. At pp. 145-7: Smith reasserted a Lockean theory of colonisation advocating 
agricultural “improvement” and justifying the possession of “waste country” or land “so thinly inhabited that the 
natives easily give place to the new settlers.” See more generally: Winch, D. Classical Political Economy and 
Colonies, (London: London School of Economics, 1965); Williams, D. “Adam Smith and Colonialism”, Journal 
of International Political Theory, 10(3), (2014), pp. 283-301. 
30 
 
pragmatic theory of political and economic governance. In proposing a ‘science of the 
legislator’,123 Smith’s concern is to demonstrate how a government can protect the population 
from famine, scarcity and external threat, and generate happiness via fostering economic 
growth. The form of statecraft invoked is based on the art of mobilising, as a transformative 
power, self-interest, private property, the functional and geographical division of labour, and 
the free market. As such, Smith’s approach to the tension between an ethic of human 
fellowship, moral sentiment, and commercial unsociability, is to put forward an art of 
governance which attempts to realise ‘collective welfare’ via mobilising and enabling 
individualistic economic desire. For Smith, however, the art of governance also aimed to 
balance this via restraining private and class interests when the desire for monopoly, profit and 
economic power threatened to undermine collective welfare and the national interests of the 
state.124 
 
The Pin Factory and the War Factory 
Smith’s arguments in favour of the global respect for individual rights, the respect for private 
property and for individual autonomy and choice within the economic realm, express a version 
of liberal cosmopolitanism.125 In his argument against mercantilism and in favour of global 
free trade Smith offered a critique of how the adoption of policies of mercantilism had turned 
economic competition into interstate war. Smith argued that commerce, which ought to be a 
“bond of union and friendship” between individuals and nations, has become the “most fertile 
source of discord and animosity”.126  
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Smith followed and developed Hume’s critique of the ‘jealousy of trade’, the idea that states 
loose-out when they act as rivals carrying out protectionist, mercantilist policies. Hume argued 
that states should recognise the mutual advantages of trade and the shared flourishing and 
progress that takes place through free and open exchange of commerce.127 Hume and Smith’s 
position involved a shift in outlook, or world view, in part found in Grotius, but also departing 
from Grotius’ Aristotelian account, which encouraged sovereigns and merchants of differing 
states to think of each other less as jealous rivals and more as trading partners within a global 
society.128 The outlook involved thinking of competing states, not in terms of enmity and threat, 
but as economic competitors within the broader field of a global geographical or spatial 
division of labour, whose unsocial material self-interest (desire for opulence, the accumulation 
of wealth), when carried out peacefully, would produce a positive social result. This position, 
later more firmly bound into a perspective of international law by Kant,129 but earlier expressed 
by Montesquieu, presents the argument that, “The natural effect of commerce is to lead to 
peace.”130 In this vein Smith argued that the shift to policies of free trade and generally open 
markets could prove something of an antidote to interstate war. Such an idea, revived in the 
20th century, has been central to liberal belief in shaping the global liberal world order and 
liberal international law.131  
 
                                                          
127 Hume, D. “Of the Jealousy of Trade” (1758) in Political Essays, pp. 150-1. 
128 Hume, D. “Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences” (1742) in Political Essays, p. 64-5. 
129 Kant, I. “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch’” (1795) in Political Writings; Kant, I. “Idea for a 
Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose” (1784) in Kant, I. Political Writings. 
130 Montesquieu, C. The Spirit of the Laws, (1748), Cohler, A. et al. (eds.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989), p. 338. 
131 See generally: Block, F. The Origins of International Economic Disorder, (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1977); Ikenberry, G.J. Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis and Transformation of the 
American World Order, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012); Sørensen, G. A Liberal World Order 
in Crisis: Choosing between Imposition and Restraint, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011). 
32 
 
Smith’s approach however only involved, at most, a ‘weak’ cosmopolitanism which accepted 
that citizens and subjects will generally favour their own state in its interaction with others. For 
Smith, the bonds of sympathy within the ‘love of country’ were stronger than the ‘love of 
humanity’.132 Further, the national political unit was viewed as the best mechanism of securing 
modern liberty.133 In this respect Smith’s account of global commercial relations, of individual 
rights to private property, economic autonomy and choice, of free markets and economic 
cooperation, was limited by a republican ethic of patriotism that had run alongside the natural 
law tradition since Aristotle and Cicero. This ethic of patriotism had the effect of causing inter-
state rivalry and conflict when the national ethic consistently trumped the humanitarian ethic. 
As such, Smith’s account of international economic competition, as a vision of humanitarian, 
cosmopolitan, market-based utility, sat alongside and in contradiction with, a republican ethic 
of patriotism which set states against each other and blinded them to any higher cosmopolitan 
interest.134 This ‘love of country’ often drove states towards war. For Smith: 
Independent and neighbouring nations, having no common superior to decide their 
disputes, all live in continual dread and suspicion of one another. Each sovereign, 
expecting little justice from his neighbours, is disposed to treat them with as little as he 
expects from them. The regard for the laws of nations, or for those rues which 
independent states profess or pretend to think themselves bound to observe in their 
dealings with one another, is often very little more than mere pretence and profession. 
From the smallest interest, upon the slightest provocation, we see those rules every day, 
either evaded or directly violated without shame or remorse. Each nation foresees, or 
imagines it foresees, its own subjugation in the increasing power and aggrandisement 
of any of its neighbours; and the mean principle of national prejudice is often founded 
upon the noble one of the love of our own country.135 
 
In this context Smith’s celebration of the economic and social utility of self-interest can be 
understood as containing both ‘light’ and ‘dark’ sides which his theory of political economy, 
and advocacy of the best economic policy for Britain in the late 18th century, constantly flipped 
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between. On the optimistic view, economic competition could sometimes be guided away from 
jealousy and envy towards the more noble sentiment of ‘emulation’ so as to foster economic 
cooperation and friendship amongst nations.136 However, this optimism struck against the logic 
of Smith’s economic theory, whereby the core driving sentiment of most economic activity 
was a self-interested and sometimes selfish one.137 Further, this optimism struck also against 
Smith’s republican, ethical theory of national patriotism which was linked to the governance 
goal of stimulating and maintaining economic growth. In this vein Smith argued that: 
(T)he great object of the political economy of every country is to increase the riches 
and power of that country.138 
 
The combination of self-interested, unsocial and often antagonistic economic competition, 
together with an ethic of patriotism in which government policy should be directed towards 
promoting the best means of generating national economic growth and wealth, meant 
pessimistically, that the economic and political relation between states could never completely 
escape the sentiments of envy, suspicion, threat and open aggression. In this respect, while 
Smith morally condemned acts of aggressive war and violent colonialism, his moral and 
economic theory can be understood as being tailored not necessarily towards the benefit of the 
whole of humanity, but instead towards the promotion of the British ‘national interest’ and the 
future British ability to hold its own in the field of war. On Smith’s account while the common 
interest of humanity was to be promoted, under the imperfect conditions of war, threat and 
unsociability between states, the national interest would sometimes conflict with the common 
interest of humanity. For reasons of ‘love of country’ the nation would have be put first.  
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An important example of this is Smith’s willingness to suspend arguments about global rights 
to free trade and free markets, and to advocate mercantilist and protectionist policies justified 
by the notion of external threat and national self-defence. For Smith protectionist policies, such 
as the Navigation Acts (1651-1849),139 were seen as a justified measure in the interest of 
protecting England and then Britain against foreign competition and military threat – 
particularly against the threat to national security posed by Holland. Smith argued that although 
Holland and England were not yet at war when the Navigation Acts were instituted, the 
measures were a necessary and legitimate means of undermining Dutch naval power.140 He 
claimed: 
The act of navigation is not favourable to foreign commerce, or to the growth of that 
opulence which can arise from it.... As defence, however, is of much more importance 
than opulence, the act of navigation is, perhaps, the wisest of all the commercial 
relations of England.141 
 
Smith’s argument in favour of the prudence of suspending the free market142 and engaging in 
protectionism as an economic weapon of war should be viewed also in the context of an 
important historical link Smith makes between wealth and warfare. For Smith the link between 
the generation of wealth and warfare is located in his account of the historical development of 
the rising costs of war and the revolution in warfare in Europe.143 He argued that the cost of 
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the burden of technological warfare (the rise of standing armies, the increased importance of 
navies, firearms, cannon, etc.144) historically placed demands on states to generate massive 
revenues to ensure their continued survival. The cost of financing endless European wars meant 
the creation of new, large bureaucratic organisations necessary for the collection and 
administration of taxation.145 In time, the cost of buying and producing armaments, the 
payment of military personnel and the funding of wars led to the creation of the public debt.146 
On Smith’s account the concern for wealth generation as a legitimate concern of the art of 
government was a historical result of the revolution in the technology and strategy of warfare. 
Military technology required wealth, and success in war required both. Smith argued: 
In ancient times the opulent and civilised found it difficult to defend themselves against 
the poor and barbarous nations. In modern times the poor and barbarous nations find it 
difficult to defend themselves against the opulent and civilised.147 
 
Understood in this context the distinction Smith makes at the very opening of the Wealth of 
Nations between rich (“civilised and thriving”) and poor (“savage”) countries148 is a question 
deeply related to the concern for self-defence and the changing technological cost of warfare 
outlined at the end of the work. The economic question Smith pursues about how to generate 
a wealthy society is inseparable from a concern with the issue of defending the state from 
external enemies – a concern which leads Smith to worry about the poor health and corruption 
of the bodies of the working poor when repetitive and mindless modern labour renders them 
inadequate for fighting.149 In general terms, for Smith, the military survival of the commercial 
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state is dependent upon being able to pay for the rising cost of warfare and to service the public 
debt. The preservation of the commercial state is dependent upon it being and remaining 
wealthy, on socially mobilising the ‘pin factory’ to pay for the ‘war factory.’ Under such 
conditions to be poor is to be trapped on the wrong side of historical and material progress and 
possibly, to be conquered.  
 
Underlying Smith’s theory of global natural rights to private property and autonomous 
economic choice, and theory of a natural law and natural logic of the market, resides a 
humanist, historically minded account focussed upon tracing the emergence of both military 
and economic power. In a sense, Smith’s approach offers a theory of governance aimed at 
channelling economic and military power, the purpose of which is to find a way to maintain 
the fortune of a particular state against the shifting ground of global economic, political and 
military relations. For Smith, the historian, both the rights of individuals, and the rights of 
states, were only ever ‘natural’ in a moral, normative sense. Historically and factually, for 
Smith, ‘right’, and equal rights, were an expression of economic and military power and often 
had to be won by violence and force. As such, Smith could speak of a time in the future when, 
with the decline in power of European nations, the formally colonised peoples of the world 
might: 
(A)rrive at that equality of courage and force which, by inspiring mutual fear, can alone 
overawe the injustice of independent nations into some sort of respect of the rights of 
one another.150 
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In such an approach Smith’s focus seems much closer to the language and analysis of Niccolò 
Machiavelli151 and G.W.F. Hegel,152 and a world away from the liberal, cosmopolitan 
approaches of Kant and Jeremy Bentham153 and their 20th century liberal inheritors. Within 
Smith’s account states rely on a combination of military and economic power to maintain their 
independence against the rise and fall in fortunes (fortuna) of other powers, and the 
independence of the state comes about through a constant tension and struggle of recognition 
(Anerkennung) between peoples and nations. 
 
Alternate Lineages of Liberal International Law 
The conceptual framework of 20th and then 21st century international law contains a number of 
distinct and interwoven lines of intellectual inheritance. When thinking about the influence the 
moral and political tradition of ‘liberalism’ has had in shaping the core elements of modern 
international law in the 19th and 20th centuries, the intellectual debt owed to figures like Cicero 
and Adam Smith have often been under-appreciated and underemphasised. Yet within the way 
in which Cicero, Grotius and Smith frame questions of property and violence, there can be 
discerned a number of distinct theoretical standpoints which find their way into the conceptual 
structure of modern liberal international law. By holding onto these points of differentiation 
and continuity we can see more clearly a number of competing lineages of liberal international 
law. 
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Cicero’s combination of the pragmatic aspects of the Roman law of property with a universal 
moral theory of Stoic natural law helps to frame juridical relations around the duty of self-
preservation, the respect of property, and duty not to harm others. Such an account has exerted 
a very long influence over Western juridical thinking. Linked however to a republican theory 
of martial virtue and celebration of the glory of conquest, Cicero’s theory of international law 
presents a bellicose, muscular theory of universal natural law which acts as an apology for 
empire. In such an account the idea of the ‘just war’ is used as a moral veil which offers 
legitimacy to aggressive, imperial acts which would otherwise contradict the general principles 
of natural law. In the 20th and 21st centuries, critics have condemned this Ciceronian strategy 
of using the ideas of natural law and ‘just war’ to justify countless acts of aggression in the 
name of international law.154 
 
Such a bellicose natural law theory of international law was rejected by Grotius and Smith. 
While Grotius’ idea of a just war based upon ‘punishment’ opens onto the slippery slope of 
states potentially manipulating a language of human rights to justify acts of aggression, 
broadly, Grotius’ theory of just war counselled restraint, prudence and often emphasised the 
benefits of non-intervention. In a similar vein Smith counselled against aggressive colonial 
adventures and expressed also a degree of scepticism of the moral language utilised by states 
to justify their often belligerent actions. Further, both Grotius and Smith expressed aspects of 
a modern, liberal, commercial ethic of statecraft and international relations which, in part, 
moved away from ancient and feudal modes of wealth accumulation via territorial conquest, 
and saw modern capital accumulation taking place primarily through open and consensual 
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relations of interstate trade. While Smith saw certain advantages to policies of colonisation, he 
saw also in the emergence of 18h century capitalism an idea in which the accumulation of 
wealth (via commerce and free trade) could potentially be disconnected from the politics of 
war. Such free trade cosmopolitanism, contained within the writings of Grotius and Smith, 
expresses a key utopian idea of modern liberal international law. 
 
Yet, Smith’s theory presents at the most, a ‘weak’ cosmopolitanism. Central to his moral theory 
is a republican ethic of ‘love of country’ which reflects a Ciceronian argument that the ethical 
bonds to family and the state are stronger than to those humans who are strangers. Smith’s 
emphasis upon this republican ethic leads him to frame the goal of wealth generation as an 
aspect of national policy, and one in which the national interest is often put above the common 
interest of humanity. Further, via developing a historical sociology of war, Smith presents a 
‘war makes states, and states make war’ thesis, a theory which is later conceptualised 
developed in differing ways in the 20th century by Max Weber155 and then by Charles Tilly and 
Michael Mann.156  
 
Smith’s historical sociology offers a way of thinking about the state as a capital accumulating 
war machine, one which is driven to grow and grows through war. In this the military, security, 
capital accumulation, and bureaucratic functions of the state historically develop by way of a 
process of mutual reinforcement. In this vein, Smith then portrays modern commercial states, 
those that would be the building blocks of any future liberal international order, as emerging 
historically as very violent, land and then capital-hungry war machines. Such an account is a 
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less optimistic, less utopian idea of a global, liberal-cosmopolitan order. It represents a more 
pragmatic theory of the liberal state and of global liberal order, one which sees the use of 
economic protectionism and violence as a sometimes ethically valid means of state policy. In 
a related sense, Smith’s historical sociology anticipates aspects of John Hobson’s and Lenin’s 
critiques of imperialist war.157 In Smith’s account unsocial and competitive global commercial 
relations, when combined with a jealousy of trade and jealousy of capital accumulation 
between states, operate as a cause of inter-state aggression and imperialist expansion. Within 
Smith’s account the positive benefits of commercial egoism and competition are portrayed as 
being sometimes incredibly socially destructive and impossibly hard to restrain at the interstate 
level. 
 
Running through the three accounts of Cicero, Grotius and Smith is a tension between a social 
ethic of care and human fellowship, and, a stress upon the unsocial role of self-interest linked 
to wealth accumulation. In Cicero this tension reflects an affirmation of the importance of 
private property within the Roman social relations in 1st century BCE.158 As such Cicero’s Stoic 
theory of natural law discards the radicalism of early Hellenistic Stoic thought which had 
rejected private property in the name an ethic of human fellowship and republican, democratic 
equality.159  
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The tension is more pronounced within Grotius’ theory of natural law, reflecting an emergence 
of expanding pockets of capitalist economic relations in Northern Europe in the 14th and 15th 
centuries, and the immense expansion of global trade and colonialism in the 16th century. The 
intensification of early capitalist economic relations in Northern Europe, and rapid expansion 
of wealth generated through global trade, meant a magnification of the productive role of the 
social utility of economic self-interest within a number of early modern societies.160 On the 
back of this emergence Grotius emphasised the Aristotelian theory that self-interest and private 
property, when combined with exchange and trade, creates a degree of social utility. Grotius’ 
theory of natural law expresses a tension between a growing understanding of the productive 
power of commercial unsocial sociability, and, an insistence upon a universal moral theory 
which aimed at restraining society from lurching headlong into egoism and rabid possessive 
individualism. Alongside a theory of natural rights to private property and a derivation of 
sovereignty based on natural rights, Grotius emphasised a broadly Aristotelian conception of 
the good life, a Stoic ethic of human fellowship, care, and compassion, and counselled 
Christian acts of charity and love in relation to economic and military dealings. In this respect, 
Grotius’ theory of international law may be thought of as straddling a number of differing 
worlds. Grotius’ thought represents a moral universe of ancient and scholastic natural law and 
virtue ethics being torn apart by the powerful historical emergence egoistic, capitalist social-
property relations. In another sense, Grotius’s thought represents a lineage of liberal 
international law which attempts to harness the productive power of commerce and the market 
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while holding onto the idea that economic relations can and should be restrained by morality 
and politics. 
 
Smith’s jurisprudence inherits Grotius’ account of natural rights, the social utility of commerce, 
the theory of historic and social progress, and the emphasis upon the natural right to free 
exchange and trade. He inherited also an understanding of an active tension between a Stoic 
ethic of human fellowship and compassion, and, the unsocial sociability of commercial 
relations. Yet, following in the steps of Pufendorf, Locke, Mandeville and Quesnay, Smith 
largely moves away from the Aristotelian, scholastic and Grotian condemnation of commercial 
egoism and radically emphasises the socially productive power of self-interest and selfishness 
in commercial relations. Economic egoism, when combined with the functional and geographic 
division of labour, is seen by Smith as a recipe for generating opulence within the state and 
across societies. One aspect of this theory, that a ‘natural’ and ‘disembedded’ economic logic 
of self-interest and the market is autonomous, universal, and should not be politically steered 
or interfered with, becomes a key principle of classical and then neoclassical economics in the 
19th and 20th centuries.161 In particular the idea of a natural, autonomous market logic comes 
into prominence from the 1980’s onwards through the emergence of a powerful and influential 
neoliberal international law and global development discourse.162  
 
Importantly however, Smith’s jurisprudence is markedly different from his 20th century 
neoliberal inheritors. His portrayal of egoism is less a celebration of selfishness than it is a 
theory of harnessing the unintended social utility of egoistic economic activity. Further, guided 
by a republican ethic of ‘love of country’ and Stoic theory of moral sentiment, Smith counselled 
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the prudence of suspending markets and reigning-in the activities of merchants and financiers 
when their interests collided with the national interest. His concept of moral sentiment looked 
also to a strong role of the state which was to intervene in social life to redress many of the 
harmful and ‘corrupting’ consequences of modern commercial relations.163  
 
In this respect a number of subsequent interpretations of Smith’s jurisprudence and economic 
theory, emphasising often radically different positions within his thought, have helped to 
influence a number of different lineages within the traditions of liberalism and liberal 
international law ranging from classical liberalism, welfare liberalism, and neoliberalism. 
Against contemporary neoliberal economic and political theory the moral and political breadth 
of Smith’s jurisprudence should be held onto as it helps to highlight the limits of any 
supposedly ‘autonomous’ and disembedded market logic. Alongside, Grotius’ Stoic and 
republican arguments for a degree of moral restraint in market relations, Smith’s historical 
sociology highlights the often violent and intrusive role of the state within the domestic and 
international economy. The historical connection between the war factory and the pin factory 
shows the ever-present role of the state in creating, guiding, defending and interfering within 
domestic and global market relations. In this respect Smith’s account offers an important 
historical reminder and rebuttal to neoliberal theories of transnational law which seek to 
diminish the role of the state in the face of a global, capitalist markets. His account stresses the 
very active role of the state in both creating, defending and destroying markets, and, in 
safeguarding the welfare of the national population. Such an account is relevant to 
understanding crucial aspects of the historical development of capitalism, and, is relevant also 
to thinking about the future relationship between capitalism and international law. 
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